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1 Introduction
1 . The global environment is a matter of beat importance to all nations.
The Rio Convention acknowledged the potential gains from co-operation
in response to the threat to climate changes due to increasing concentra-
tion of C02 in the atmosphere . Yet differences of opinions prevail about
the main problems, and about the institutions to manage cooperation. In-
dustrial countries typically focus on the potential problems posed by the
rapid growth of population in developing countries, and the environmen-
tal pressure, in particular from carbon emissions, that this could create in
25-50 years time . The developing countries view the carbon emission prob-
lem as one which originates, historically and currently, from the industrial
countries, and one which requires their immediate action . [7] (81-
2. The problem of finding carbon abatement policies is complicated by the
scientific uncertainty about the impact of carbon emissions on the climate.
We have limited experience in evaluating and implementing the type of
policies which would be needed for the abatement of these emissions [91 .
In order to implement global environmental policies successfully it seems
crucial to develop a clear evaluation of the facts, of the different positions,
and of the economic issues at stake. It also seems crucial to develop,
as a starting point, a common language to facilitate communication and
negotiation, and to increase the likelihood of finding and implementing
cooperative solutions for all countries involved . The conceptual formula-
tion of markets and the economic data provided by the OECD economic
model GREEN could prove very valuable, and will be used in this paper.
3. A good starting point is provided by the paper "Implementing Global
Environmental Policy" by J. Coppel of the OECD Resource Allocation
Division [10] . Coppel's paper is an excellent contribution, providing an
interesting discussion of the main issues . Some of its value is its focus,
which develops an industrial country' perspective.
4. This paper was commissioned to discuss Coppel's, and to address the
same issues while formulating a cooperative approach to carbon emission
abatement policy, which takes into consideration the position of developing
and well as industrial countries.
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5 . 1 will discuss Coppel's paper, and evaluate his proposal for a carbon abate-
ment tax using basic economics and the data offered by GREEN and other
sources such as the IAE . I will also propose a complementary set of eco-
nomic policies, including a modified carbon tax, and other associated poli-
cies for containing environmental damage in the context of international
trade, and of financial policies by the World Bank and the IMF .
2 Carbon Emissions, Population and Industri-
alization
1 . Historically and presently, the large majority of the carbon emissions,
about 73%, originate in industrialized countries . These countries have the
lowest population growth in the word, see Table 7 of [10], attached at
the end of this paper . The US alone, with 5% of the world's population,
contributes 24.6% of the world's total carbon emissions . This is not sur-
prising, since the US consumes about 27% of all the petroleum produced
in the world [15] . About 55% of all carbon emissions originate in the
OECD countries, and about 17% in the ex-Soviet Union .
2 . Almost 4/5 of the world's population is in the non-OECD countries . In
per-capita terms the OECD countries contribute at least 450% more car-
bon emission than do the non-OECD countries .
3 . Obviously this could change in the future : the developing countries could
indeed deviate from past experience and become a serious source of emis-
sions . It seems wise to take precautions to avoid such outcomes . Yet if
immediate action is needed in curtailing carbon emissions to prevent a
major climate change, in order to have a substantive effect, significant
abatement must take place in the major emitters, namely in the OECD
countries and the ex-Soviet Union .
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Evaluating a Global Carbon Tax
1 . J . Coppel's paper [10] proposes a global carbon tax of US$25 per ton
of carbon emitted (or equivalent) . Certain aspects of his proposal were
simulated using the OECD model GREEN. These simulations, which were
reported in [10], will be discussed here . They compare GDP loss, tax
revenues and emission reductions up to year 2020 (see Table 3, page 23 of
2 . Using basic economic principles, economic data from the OECD's GREEN
model and from the International Energy Agency [18]and [17] 1 will es-
tablish that while making a valuable contribution and exhibiting many
positive features, unless certain modifications are introduced, the global
carbon tax proposed by J . Coppel :
" (a) would be excessively regressive, imposing a disproportionately large
burden on the lower income countries, and decreasing the likelihood of its
implementation .
" (b) could be counterproductive in terms of overall economic efficiency .
J . Coppel's proposal :
" (c) concentrates on possible distortions from energy subsidies in developing
countries, but makes no reference of similar distortions arising from the
large energy subsidies existing in OECD countries, and
" (d) could be associated with higher rates of population growth in devel-
oping countries, contradicting its own stated objectives .
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A Proposal for a Modified Global Carbon Tax
1 . 1 propose here a complementary global carbon tax ; which could also be
simulated using the OECD's GREEN model. The simulations could have
a starting date of 1995, until 2050 . By running this new tax proposal in
parallel with Coppel's, one should be able to explore the advantages and
disadvantages of the two proposals, and could therefore improve upon
both .
2 . If properly implemented, my proposal :
" (e) would increase energy prices progressively in all OECD countries over a
period of several years so as to reach the levels currently paid in Germany
and Japan,
(f) would phase down gradually over the same period all energy subsidies
in OECD countries,
(g) would initiate the taxation of carbon emissions in low income countries
when their contribution to emissions becomes significant, for example,
when it reaches a given proportion of the world's emission . At present,
developing countries, which make up about 4/5 of the world's population,
contribute less than 30% of global carbon emissions,
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Policies Associated to a Carbon Tax
The following policies could be at least as effective as a carbon tax, and are
recommended as means to containing environmental damage :
" (h) Reformulate trade strategies in developing countries away from en-
vironmentally intensive sectors such as raw materials and minerals, and
into skill intensive and environmentally friendly sectors which use newer
technologies and which have higher growth potential .
" (i) Reformulate and implement new international national and interna-
tional accounting systems which incorporate a measure of international
environmental effects,
" (j) Reformulate World Bank and Iti1F financing criteria so that they be-
come consistent with these environmental objectives .
" (k) Develop better systems of property rights and market-based strategies
for protecting those common property environmental resources in devel-
oping countries which are most endangered at present such as fresh water,
forested and grazable land, and biodiversity reservoirs .
6 Analyzing the Economic Foundations of Car-
bon Emission Abatement
1 . J .Coppel's proposal is for a small global carbon tax of $25 per ton which
corresponds to about S3 per barrel of oil ([10], paragraph 22, page 9) .
About 50% of the expected world revenues, of about US$ 150 billion per
annum, would be raised from OECD countries . Coppel's paper [10] uses
the OECD GREEN model to analyze the consequences of this tax without
any explicit side-payments to non-OECD countries ([10] paragraph 23,
page 9) . Potential side-payments to developing countries are nevertheless
mentioned by Coppel ; these are limited to at most 25% of OECD tax
revenues ([10], paragraph 52, page 19) . In practice, however, no side-
payments have been included in the simulations of the GREEN model
[10], page 9, paragraph 23 and footnote 13 .
2 . A salient feature of Coppel's global carbon tax is that developing countries
are taxed at several times the rate of industrial countries, as a proportion
of their GNPs. For example, high income countries such as the US and
France would pay in taxes approximately 3/4% and 1/3% of their GNP
respectively, while lower income countries such as China and Mexico pay
instead several times that amount . In fact China pays 4.40% of GNP and
Mexico, 1.25% of its GNP's see Table 2, page 22 of [10] . Furthermore, if
computed in terms of GNP per capita, this difference would increases dra-
matically. This disproportion is maintained across the board : the devel-
oping countries in general pay several times the rate paid by the industrial
countries, see table 2 of [10] .
3 . The tax proposed by Coppel imposes a disproportionate large tax burden
on lower income countries, see paragraphs 10 and 17 of [10], because al-
though their per-capita emissions are extremely low compared with those
of the industrial countries, their output (GNP) is more carbon intensive .
Since the tax is levied on output, the lower income countries pay more tax
as a proportion of their GNP.
4 . Of course, if the carbon tax were levied on the basis of carbon emissions
per-capita, then the impact of the tax would be reversed : the industrial
countries would pay then several times as much as the developing countries
do .
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The Issue of Abatement Costs
1 . The developing countries are said to have lower abatement costs than
the OECD countries, see pages 4, 5 and 7 of [10] . Following up on this
point, the author then argues that "A well-designed agreement will try to
ensure that marginal costs of abatement will be equalized across countries .
Countries with lower abatement costs will initiate the largest absolute
emission changes'", see page 7, paragraph 17 of [10] . Although in principle
this observation about costs has little bearing on the actual tax burden
of countries as proportion of their GNP, it may appear to be offered as
an explanation of the fact that the developing countries' burden is several
times higher than that of the industrial countries . For this reason it seems
worth examining the question of costs in some detail .
2 . The argument summarized in the previous paragraph in support of equat-
ing marginal costs, and the disproportionate taxation of low income coun-
tries, has three flaws . The first pertains data, and the latter two are based
on basic economic analysis .
3 . The evidence offered in [10] for the fact that developing countries have
lower abatement costs than industrial countries, provided in its paragraph
10 and in footnote 7 on page 5 is : "simulations with GREEN and other
general equilibrium models suggest that China, India and the ex-USSR
could abate at low cost whereas abatement costs could tend to be high in
OECD countries'" . The data reference provided is a 1992 OECD economic
study No.19 by A. Dean and P . Hoeller, which does not in fact report on
actual data but rather, as its title indicates, on "evidence from six global
models" . This presents a problem in terms of the interpretation of the
data . Global models are not sources of data, as much as of simulated or
projected data which is a resultant of observations plus the assumptions
which are built into the models . For example, the simulations carried out
in GREEN contain many specifications which may not be a representation
of reality but rather a representation of certain assumptions about technol-
ogy. Therefore the question of whether developing countries have higher
or lower abatement costs than the industrial countries is not satisfactorily
resolved by referring to simulations in GREEN or in other global models .
The information we obtain from these sources depends on the assumptions
of these models . In other words, one may be assuming that developing
countries have lower abatement costs rather than establishing it . This is-
sue is of importance, because a way that the "free rider" problem appears
in the case of providing public goods- such as for example, abatement
which decreases C02 concentration in the atmosphere-is by each party
proposing that others should provide the good, because it costs them less
to do so . For a treatment of free riding problems see e.g . Atkinson and
Stiglitz [20] .
4 . Equally questionable is the assumption that marginal costs of abatement
should be equalized across countries for economic efficiency . There are two
economic reasons for this . The first reason is that economic activities with
large fixed costs may have decreasing marginal costs . Under these condi-
tions, the equating of marginal costs can lead to economic inefficiencies .
As a matter of fact, in the presence of fixed costs, the allocations obtained
by average cost pricing may be more efficient than those obtained under
marginal cost pricing . These are well known facts which were established
in the literature several years ago, see e.g . Guesnerie [16], Brown and Heal
[11] and [12], and Chichilnisky [5] .
5 . Abatement technologies have large fixed costs . A typical example is the
shift from leaded to unleaded gasoline, a shift which is yet to be made
in many developing countries . The development of engines which run on
unleaded fuel, the re-equiping refineries to produce unleaded gasoline, and
the replacement of existing vehicles, must all be included and lead to very
large fixed costs indeed. Republica Dominicana is an example of a country
in which leaded gasoline is currently in use, and the only obstacle which is
recognized for its substitution by unleaded fuel is the obsolence that this
will imply for its stock of vehicles . Large fixed costs for abatement lead to
decreasing marginal costs, or economies of scale . In such cases marginal
cost pricing may not lead to efficient outcomes, see e.g . Guesnerie [16],
Brown and Heal [?], [12], and Chichilnisky [5] .
6 . There is a second reason for questioning the policy of equalizing marginal
costs of abatement . This equalization would lead to efficiency if the goods
under consideration were private goods. But in our case we are dealing
with a public good, i .e . one which, by definition, is consumed by all in the
same quantity : the decreases in atmospheric C02 concentration . While
the impact of weather changes may vary from country to country, in ways
that it is very difficult to predict, the overall C02 concentration is shared
equally by all nations in the world . The quality of the world's atmosphere
is a public good, Heal [14] and Nordhaus [19] .
7 . This public good is "produced" by the C02 emissions (or by the abate-
ment of these emissions) of a finite number of large agents, namely the
countries . In this sense, the classical solutions for finding the efficient
levels of production of public goods of Lindahl (1919) and Bowen (1943),
which were extended subsequently by Samuelson (1954), see Atkinson and
Stiglitz, particularly Lecture 16, and page 489, footnote 3, [20], do not
apply. In these cases the public good is produced by a single agent . Ex-
ample of such public goods are a bridge or a road : the relevant efficiency
conditions in these cases are to equate the sum of the agent's rate of sub-
stitution between the public good and a private good (such as income)
and the marginal rate of transformation between the two, at a central
production facility .
8 . When each consumer is also a producer of the public good, as it is the
case of emissions or abatement of carbon, then efficnet allocations take a
different form, closer to the efficient allocations of a market economy with
externalities [1] . An efficient allocation now requires that the marginal cost
of abatement in each country be inversely proportional to that country's
marginal utility of consumption of all other private goods . This point is
developed in detail in the last Section of this paper .
9 . Economic efficiency in the allocation of private and public goods dic-
tates in this case that countries with higher marginal utilities of pri-
vate consumption-which are typically the lower income countries-should
have lower marginal cost of abatement than countries with lower marginal
utility of consumption-which are typically the higher income countries .
In particular, one should not expect the efficient allocation to equalize
marginal costs of abatement across countries, because doing so could con-
flict with the Paxeto efficiency of the allocation between private consump-
tion and the production of a clean atmosphere . It should be emphasized
that this result applies to the case where the good in question is a public
good, such as the C02 concentration in the atmosphere, and not when
it is a private good . In addition, this result applies to the case where
abatement is "produced" in each country, and produced at the expense of
other private consumption goods, rather than when it is "produced at a
central facility" such as a bridge or a road . This is discussed in detail in
Sectionll, Proposition 1 .
10 . Efficient allocations also require that those countries with a higher income
level contribute a higher proportion of the abatement, with the constant
of proportionality increasing with the overall productivity of the country's
abatment technology . This point is also discussed in Section 11, Proposi-
tion 2 .
11 . Once the optimal allocation of the public good is found, then it is pos-
sible that other agreements could emerge about changing the technology
of production, so that a central world facility produces abatement, and it
does so by allocating abatement efforts in countries with lower marginal
costs . But the achievement of this central technology agency seems highly
unlikely. This is because carbon emissions are "produced" automatically
whenever private goods which use fossil fuel energy are produced . It seems
impossible at present to entertain the idea of a central production for emis-
sions without a simultaneous central facility for the production of private
goods, an event that seems well beyond the scope of what is possible or
desirable at present .
12 . Once the optimal consumption/abatement levels in each country are found,
then other arrangements could be achieved for the payment and produc-
tion of the public good. For example, quotas on emissions could be as
signed to each country on the basis of optimal abatement/consumption
levels, and then permits could be issued and freely traded as financial
instruments across countries, on the basis of these quotas . However, it
is not clear that such a permits market would improve welfare, or under
what conditions . In economies with public goods, the appropriate pric-
ing system may be one which is personalized to the traders, rather than
a competitive pricing system . The matter requires further research . A
system of permits for carbon emissions has of course been contemplated
for some time, but the country-by-country quotas for these permits, have
not been connected so far to the optimality conditions for the allocation
of public goods . How the quotas are related to income is the subject of
Proposition 2 in the last Section . Typically, Pareto efficiency dictates that
quotas for emission be inversely proportional to income levels, see Propo-
sition 2, and also inversely related to the productivity of the country's
abatement technology.
8 Coal Subsidies in Industrial and Developing
Countries
1 . Another interesting aspect of Coppel's paper is the emphasis on phasing
out what it calls "energy subsidies" in developing countries . This is one
of the policies proposed, see Part b) Page 13 of [10] .
2 . GREEN measures energy subsidies by the divergence between the world's
and the country's price of energy. Therefore it is not entirely appropriate
to call these subsidies . They should rather be called differences in factor
prices .
3 . It is well known, however, that factor prices and indeed most prices in
developing countries, are lower than their counterparts in industrial coun-
tries . A well known example is the price of labor . Indeed, price differ-
ences are so substantial, with the developing countries exhibiting typically
lower prices than the industrial countries, that recently the World Bank
has taken to measure GNP using "purchasing power parity" rather than
international prices . This has made a large difference in the computation
of income differentials between industrial and developing countries .
4 . It is notable that the differences in labor prices across countries have not
led, and are not likely to lead, to international intervention in the form of
labor taxes . Coppel in fact proposes such a tax for a similar input, energy.
5 . Moreover, in the case of coal there exist very large real production subsi-
dies in the industrial countries . A preliminary observation indicates that
they could be at least as large in value as the value of those price differ-
ences which GREEN calls "subsidies" in developing countries, although
the actual comparison must be made in more detail, see [10], Table 6 . [18]
and [17] .
6 . For example, in Germany alone coal production is subsidized at the rate
of about US86 billion per annum. A larger figure of US88 billion holds for
the UK. In total the OECD countries subsidize coal production by about
USS16 billion yearly, see [17], page 201, copy enclosed at the end of this
paper .
7 . Indeed, the European Coal and Steel Community, which was created be-
fore the signature of the Treaty of Rome and which was a precursor of
the EEC, had as a main purpose the support and rationalization of these
industries and included provisions for subsidies to support employment
and production . The existence of such sizable subsidies should induce se-
rious inefficiencies in the industrial countries, but the issue is not raised
by Coppel, and the figures are not even reported in [10] or [3] . Clearly any
policy for eliminating production subsidies should include the subsidies of
OECD countries .
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Incentives for Implementing Abatement Poli-
cies
1 . As already mentioned, abatement technologies have large fixed costs . A
typical example is the shift from leaded to unleaded gasoline, a shift which
is yet to be made in many developing countries . Marginal costs may then
decrease with volume, leading to increasing returns to scale . In such cases,
marginal cost pricing may not lead to efficient outcomes, and it may, in
fact, be inferior in terms of efficiency, to average cost pricing . These results
have been known in the literature for some time, see e.g . Guesnerie [16],
Brown and Heal [?], [12], and Chichilnisky [5] .
2 . In addition, abatement technologies are knowledge intensive . This leads
also to increasing returns to scale, Chichilnisky [6], some of which are
internal and others external to the firm . Knowledge often has often spill-
over effects for society as a whole . This is another reason why marginal
cost pricing may not lead to efficient outcomes .
3 . It is seldom noticed that the economies of scale of abatement should be
welcome, because this could lead naturally to more cooperation than is to
be expected between the countries who are parties to an abatement effort .
This is because, for the same costs two countries can achieve proportion-
ately more than each one can . This induces more incentives for cooper-
ation than is normally expected in the problems connected with paying
for the provision of public goods, Heal [13], and Carraro and Siniscalco
[4] . For example, it checks the tendency towards the standard "free rider"
problem to reach agreements to pay for the provision of public goods .
4 . The extent of external economies of scale in the adoption of carbon abate-
ment technologies depends on the initial level of knowledge . For example,
countries of similar levels of development can benefit more readily from the
economies of scale implicit in adopting each other's new clean technologies
than do countries at different levels of development .
5 . The transfer of technology between countries could therefore have a salu-
tary effect in their ability and willingness to cooperate in international
abatement efforts, Heal [13] Carraro and Siniscalco [4] .
10 Income, Abatement and Population Growth
1 . Coppel mentions that, according to the World Bank, an additional invest-
ment of 2-3% of GNP is needed in developing countries to reduce local
environmental damages and to provide access to sanitation and clean wa-
ter, to improve air quality and protect natural habitats, see paragraph 14,
page 6 of [10] .
2 . Coppel also points out to population growth in developing countries as one
of the major causes of environmental degradation, to the extent that he
recommends using tax revenues to finance the provision of contraceptives
in developing countries, see page 3, para 5 and pages 14-17 paragraphs 38
to 43 .
3 . Since the transfers suggested Coppel's paper have not been simulated with
GREEN, see page 9, paragraph 23 and footnote 13, their overall effects
and the use of such transfers for the provision of contraceptives is a highly
speculative matter . Therefore the recommendation seems somewhat un-
realistic .
4 . But more fundamentally, the strategy of raising proportionately higher
taxes from developing countries could be counterproductive with the stated
aims of population control in the paper . The level of income is the only
generally accepted and predictable explanation for population growth, and
is inversely related to it . Therefore, if a highly regressive carbon tax is
levied, as is the one proposed by Coppel, it will decrease the level of
income in developing countries, and this could lead to increases in popu-
lation growth and to further environmental degradation . The tax could
defeat its own purposes .
5 . A regressive carbon tax as proposed by Coppel could furthermore damage
the fragile growth prospects of many lower income countries . To the extent
that cleaner technologies require a certain amount of industrialization,
regressive taxation could decrease the prospect of industrialization and
could therefore damage rather than improve the chances of controlling
carbon emissions .
11
	
Pareto Efficient Abatement Strategies
This section develops the basic economic framework to compute an efficient
allocation of abatement strategy across countries . It considers the atmosphere
as a public good (see Heal [14] and Nordhaus [19]) which is produced along with
the production of private consumption goods, in each country.
Consider a world economy with N countries, N >_ 2, indexed by n = 1 . . .1V .
Each country has a utility function un which depends on its consumption of
private goods cn,, and on the quality of the world's atmosphere, a, which is a
public good . Formally,
un (c ,a) measures welfare, where
u, : R2 --> R is a continuous, concave function .
The quality of the atmosphere, a, is measured by its concentration of C02 . The
concentration of C02 is "produced" by emissions of carbon, which are positively
12
associated to the level of consumption of private goods, cn , : i .e .
a an
where an
	
for each country n = 1 . . .N,
4)n <0.
The "production functions" (D, are continuous and concave . For example, con-
sider the standard case where each country has a level of income Yn and the
constraint (Dn is given by :
c,-a," =Y,, i.e . ID,t (cn ) = Y, -a, .
An allocation of consumption and abatement across all countries is a vector
(c l , a l , . . ., c,v, a v) E R2N . An allocation is called feasible if it satisfies the con-
straint (1) . A feasible allocation (ci, a,*, . . ., cV, aN*) is Pareto efficient if there
is no other feasible solution at which everybody's utility is at least as high, and
someone's utility is strictly higher, than at (ci, a*, . . ., c,v, a, *) .
A Pareto efficient allocation must maximize a weighted sum of welfare
W(c1 . . .cn , a) = > " A,un(cn, a)
n=1
and for simplicity we shall assume that all weights are equal . Each country n
faces a constraint in terms of allocating total endowments into either consump-
tion cn or atmospheric quality, an , represented by the function 4)  . Then a
Pareto efficient solution is described by a solution to the problem :
Note that, by definition, the marginal cost of abatement is the inverse of the
marginal productivity of the function (Dn :
11/ICn (an ) = 1/~n(an)
A Pareto efficient solution solves problem (3) .
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Proposition 1 : At a Pareto efficient allocation (ci, a*, . . ., c*, a,v*), the marginal
cost of abatement in each country, NCn (an), is inversely proportional, to
the marginal utility of consumption for the private good cn , aun /Ocn .
Max W(c, . . .cn , a) = un (cn, a), (3)
n=1
subject to an = (Dn (cn), n = 1 . . .N (4)
N
and a = (5)
n=1
Proof.:
The solution to the maximization problem (3) must satisfy the first order
conditions :
for each country j = 1 . . .1V . Since at a Pareto efficient allocation the expression
(~n1 aun /aan ) is the same constant for all countries, denoted K, and since,
as noted in (6)
IVIC,(an ) = 1/~DT,,(an)
we have that a Pareto efficient allocation is characterized by :
MCj (a*) =
	
K
au; /ac;
and the proposition follows . 0
Consider for example the case where there are two countries, each with a
Cobb- Douglas utility function,
un(cn,a) = c' a 1 = cn a 1 + a2)'-',n
and the abatement production function (Dn is
an = (Dn(cn) = kn(Y, - cn)1~2, kn > 0, for n = 1 . 2
where, for example, k1 = k and k2 = 1 . This allows us to accommodate poten-
tially different efficiency of abatement across countries . For simplicity, the two
countries are assumed to have the same utility function . Then :
Proposition 2: At a Pareto efficient allocation, the proportion of income which
each country allocates to carbon emission abatement, must be proportional
to that country's income level, and the constant of proportionality increases
with the efficiency of the country's emission abatement.
Let
Proof: Our problem (3) can now be written as :
Max,,,,, W(Cl, c2) _
ax {ci [k(Yl - c1) 1 I 2 + (Y2 - c2)1/2]
1-a + c2 [k(Yl - c 1 ) 1 /2 + (y2 - C2)1/2J 1-a J
A = [k(Yj - Cl)1/2 + (Y2 -
C2)1/2]
.
The first order conditions for a maximum are then :
aci -'Al-° - 1/2(Y1 - Cl)-1/2k {cc'A-"(1 - a) + c2(1 - a)A-° } = 0
14
and
ace-lA" - 1/2(Y2 - c2) _1/2 {c1" A- ° (1 - a) + c2 (1 - a)A-°`} _
which simplify to :
cl
c2
_i
	
Yi _ ci i/2-kCY2-c2\
_
Since a < 1 this implies that for Pareto efficiency, the income allocated to
abatement by each country (an = Yn - cn, , n = l, 2) must be proportional to
the income level, or the level of consumption, of the country (cn ) . Furthermore
the larger is the abatement productivity of a country (k = kl ) ; the larger is its
abatement allocation as a proportion of income .
Conclusions .
It follows that the problem of efficient allocation of abatement among coun-
tries does not yield the usual condition for the optimal provision of public goods .
For a detailed discussion of this problem for economies with uncertainty, see also
Chichilnisky and Heal [9] . The first order conditions for the provision of a pub-
lic good (see Atkinson and Stiglitz [20]) assumes that agents make independent
consumption decisions, but that the good is provided by a central production
facility . It is then straightforward to derive the classical first-order conditions
stating that the sum of agents' marginal rates of substitution between the public
good and a private good, must equal the marginal rate of transformation be-
tween the two in the central production facility . From this one may be tempted
to deduce that the marginal cost of abatement must be equalized among all
countries, but this would be incorrect . In contrast with the classical case, each
country produces emissions or abatement on its own, and it may do so with
different technologies . The results are then significantly altered . There is no
central production facility which transforms a consumption good into a better
atmosphere concentration or a lower climate risk : this process is undertaken
independently in each country via its own emission or abatement efforts . Hence
while the atmosphere is a classic public good, the way it is produced is not
classic, and the first order conditions for efficient provision of this "good" are
different from the classical one, and closer to those characteristic of a general
externality. In fact our model in this Section is consistent with that of Baumol
and Oates [1], Section 4 .
The analysis of Pigouvian taxes for markets with external effects which deals
with the optimal tax for the provision of private goods which produce external-
ities, but are nevertheless private in the sense that one person's consumption
precludes others' consumption, is not applicable here . By contrast, here the
good a in question (e.g . the concentration of C02 in the atmosphere) is a pub-
lic good . This is because C02 in the atmosphere mixes very uniformly, and the
whole world is subject to similar concentrations .
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that the equalization of marginal costs of abate-
ment is therefore not a reliable guide to efficient economic allocations . Another
15
implication is that there is no economic reason for placing the burden of the
largest initial emission changes on those countries with lower marginal costs .
Placing the burden of the initial adjustments on the higher income countries
could in fact be more efficient, as demonstrated in Propositions 1 and 2 .
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